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"ARE YOU SERIOUS?": EXAMINING THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF AN INDIVIDUAL
MANDATE FOR HEALTH INSURANCE
Ryan C. Patterson*
Are you serious? Are you serious?
Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the House, responding to a question about
the constitutionality of an individual mandate for health insurance'
INTRODUCTION
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) 2 has
significantly reformed the U.S. health care system. As a result, nearly
all Americans will be required to purchase health insurance.3 An indi-
vidual mandate for health insurance is not a new idea. In 1993, the
Senate Republican Task Force drafted a health care reform bill that
included an individual mandate.4
As the debate over health care reform has unfolded, questions
have been raised about whether the Constitution grants Congress the
power to impose an individual mandate to purchase health insur-
ance.5 In 1994, the Congressional Budget Office addressed the issue,
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2011; B.S., Biology,
Westmont College, 2001. I wish to thank Professors Jay Tidmarsh and Rick Garnett
for their guidance and feedback. This Note is dedicated to my parents for their love
and support.
1 Donald Lambro, Constitutionality of Health Overhaul Questioned, WASH. TIMES,
Oct. 28, 2009, at Al (quoting Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the House, U.S. House of
Representatives), available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/oct/28/
constitutionality-of-health-overhaul-questioned.
2 See H.R. 3590, 111th Cong. § 5000A (2010) (establishing an individual man-
date for a majority of Americans to purchase health insurance), amended by Health
Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, H.R. 4872, 111th Cong.
3 See id.
4 See S. 1770, 103d Cong. § 100 (1993); see also Candice Hoke, Constitutional
Impediments to National Health Reform: Tenth Amendment and Spending Clause Hurdles, 21
HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 489, 515-18 (1994) (summarizing the bill).
5 Commentators have come down on both sides of the issue. For arguments that
an individual mandate is unconstitutional, see Andrew P. Napolitano, Health-Care
2003
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concluding that " [a] mandate requiring all individuals to purchase
health insurance would be an unprecedented form of federal
action."6 More recently, the Congressional Research Service con-
cluded that Congress might have the power to enact an individual
mandate "as part of its taxing and spending power, or its power to
regulate interstate commerce."7 However, it acknowledged that
"[w]hether such a requirement would be constitutional under the
Commerce Clause is perhaps the most challenging question posed by
such a proposal, as it is a novel issue whether Congress may use this
clause to require an individual to purchase a good or a service.",
This Note analyzes whether Congress has the power to enact an
individual mandate for health insurance under the Taxing and
Spending Clause and Commerce Clause.9 Part I examines the
Refonn and the Constitution, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 2009, at A19, arguing that it exceeds
the scope of the commerce power; David B. Rivkin, Jr. & Lee A. Casey, Mandatory
Insurance Is Unconstitutional, WALL ST.J., Sept. 18, 2009, at A23, arguing that it exceeds
the scope of the commerce and tax powers; Randy Barnett, Is Mandatory Health Insur-
ance Unconstitutional?, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Sept. 18, 2009, 12:17 PM), http://
www.volokh.com/posts/1253290664.shtml, arguing that there is no textual basis in
the Constitution for using the commerce or tax powers to enact an individual man-
date. For arguments that an individual mandate is constitutional, see Mark A. Hall,
The Constitutionality of Mandates to Purchase Health Insurance, 37J.L. MED. & ETHICS 40,
40-48 (2009), arguing it is within the scope of the commerce and tax powers; Daniel
Gottlieb, Note, You Can Take This Health Insurance and . .. Mandate It?, 33 SETON HALL
LEGIs. J. 535, 553-63 (2009), arguing it is within the scope of the commerce power;
Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitutionality of Healthcare, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 6, 2009, at A23,
arguing it is within the scope of the commerce and tax powers; Jonathan Adler, Is
ObamaCare Unconstitutional?, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 22, 2009, 6:50 PM),
http://www.volokh.com/posts/1250981450.shtml, reaching the same conclusion as
Chemerinsky; Michael C. Dorf, The Constitutionality of Health Insurance Refonn, Part I:
Congressional Power, FINDLAw (Nov. 2, 2009), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/2009
1102.html, reaching the same conclusion as Adler and Chemerinsky.
6 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGETARY TREATMENT OF AN INDIVIDUAL MANDATE
To Buy HEALTH INSURANCE 1 (1994), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/48xx/
doc4816/doc38.pdf.
7 JENNIFER STAMAN & CYNTHIA BROUGHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., REQUIRING
INDIVIDUALS TO OBTAIN HEALTH INSURANCE: A CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIs 18 (2009),
available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40725_20090724.pdf.
8 Id. at 3.
9 The scope of this Note is limited in two ways. First, I analyze only the internal
limits of the taxing and commerce powers; external limits on Congress's power to
enact an individual mandate will not be addressed. For a definition of internal and
external limits, see infra note 127 and accompanying text. Commentators have iden-
tified several possible external limits on an individual mandate to purchase health
insurance. For a discussion of whether an individual mandate violates the Takings
Clause, see STAMAN & BROUGHER, supra note 7, at 12-13, concluding it is unlikely a
court would consider requiring individuals to purchase health insurance a taking;
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problems with our current health care system and the policy argu-
ment for an individual mandate. Part II addresses the complaint that
an individual mandate would be an unprecedented assault on individ-
ual liberty. It compares the effects that prohibitions and mandates
have on personal freedom and notes that there is precedent for the
federal government mandating action as a condition of citizenship.
Part III examines whether Congress can enact an individual mandate
under its taxing power. Finally, Part IV analyzes whether an individual
mandate can be enacted under Congress's power to regulate inter-
state commerce.
I. A BRIEF EXAMINATION OF HEALTH CARE IN THE UNITED STATES
AND THE ARGUMENT FOR AN INDIVIDUAL MANDATE
The rising cost of health care and the number of Americans with-
out health insurance are two of the main concerns that drove the
push for health care reform.10 In 2007, health care spending in the
United States was equivalent to 16.2% of gross domestic product
(GDP). 1 This total is expected to rise to 25% of GDP by 2025 if our
current health care system is not reformed.12 Since 1980, the annual
rate of growth in medical care prices was 4.7%-almost double the
annual rate of inflation.' 3 The cost of obtaining health insurance has
Hall, supra note 5, at 45-47, arguing that it is not a regulatory taking. For a discussion
of whether an individual mandate violates substantive due process rights, see STAMAN
& BROUGHER, supra note 7, at 9-11, noting that the Supreme Court has not recog-
nized a fundamental right to be uninsured and evaluating an individual mandate as
economic legislation; Hall, supra note 5, at 45, arguing it does not violate substantive
due process rights. For a discussion of whether the individual mandate and religious
exemptions violate the First Amendment's religion clauses, see STAMAN & BROUGHER,
supra note 7, at 13-18. For a discussion of whether an individual mandate violates the
Equal Protection Clause, see id. at 11-12. Second, I confine my analysis to the inter-
pretation of the taxing and commerce powers established by Supreme Court prece-
dent. I do not address the question of whether the Supreme Court has properly
interpreted the Commerce Clause and Taxing and Spending Clause.
10 See BoB LYKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., HEALTH CARE REFORM 1 (2009), available
at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/122947.pdf. The quality of health
care is also a driving factor. Despite the United States spending "substantially more
on health care per person than other industrialized countries, it scores only average
or somewhat worse on many quality of care indicators." Id.
11 Id. at 4.
12 Id.
13 Id. The development of new drugs and other advancements in medical tech-
nology is regarded by many economists as the primary cause for the increase in health
care spending. See id. at 5.
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increased significantly in the last decade, making it difficult for some
Americans to afford health insurance.14
In 2007, 45.7 million Americans were uninsured at some point
during the year.15 Over ninety-eight percent of the uninsured are
under age sixty-five. 16 The two main groups of the uninsured are low-
wage workers who do not receive health insurance through their
employers and healthy young people unwilling to buy insurance at its
current price.' 7 Thirty-nine percent of the uninsured are nineteen to
thirty-five years old,18 and sixteen percent of the uninsured earn at
least $50,000 per year in household income.19 One recent study esti-
mates that forty-three percent of uninsured Americans have enough
disposable income to afford health insurance but voluntarily choose
not to purchase it.20
Being uninsured can adversely affect an individual's health. The
uninsured have a higher premature mortality rate than people with
health insurance.2 1 They are less likely to receive preventative care
and more likely to postpone seeking treatment for an illness than the
insured.22 As a result, their medical problems are more serious by the
14 See LUCIEN WULSIN, JR. & ADAM DOUGHERTY, CAL. RESEARCH BURFAU, INDIVID-
UAL MANDATE: A BACKGROUND REPORT 3 (2009), available at http://www.library.ca.
gov/crb/09/09-007.pdf (noting that health insurance "premiums have outpaced
wages three-fold since 2000").
15 CARMEN DENAVAs-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND
HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2007, at 19 (2008), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2008pubs/p60-235.pdf. It is thought that another sev-
enteen million Americans are underinsured. Jonathan M. Kucskar, Comment, Labo-
ratories of Democracy: Why State Health Care Experimentation Offers the Best Chance to Enact
Effective Federal Health Care Reform, 11 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 377, 383-84 (2008)
(defining "underinsured" as having insufficient health insurance coverage).
16 LYKE, supra note 10, at 13 app. A (noting that only 1.9% of individuals age
sixty-five or older are uninsured).
17 WULSIN & DOUGHERTY, supra note 14, at 2.
18 Id.
19 LYKE, supra note 10, at 14 app. B. Within this group, almost nineteen percent
had household incomes between $75,000 and $99,999 and twenty-five percent had
annual household incomes greater than $100,000. See id.
20 JUNE E. O'NEILL & DAVE M. O'NEILL, EMP'T POLICIES INST., WHO ARE THE UNIN-
SURED? AN ANALYSIS OF AMERICA'S UNINSURED POPULATION, THEIR CHARACTERISTICS
AND THEIR HEALTH 5 (2009), available at www.epionline.org/studies/oneill-06-2009.
pdf.
21 See WuLSIN & DOUGHERTY, supra note 14, at 1.
22 See LYKE, supra note 10, at 3; see also O'NEILL & O'NEILL, supra note 20, at
20-21 (presenting data that show the uninsured are less likely to have their blood
pressure checked and less likely to get a routine check-up, flu shot, pap smear, PSA
test, or mammogram than people with health insurance).
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time they seek treatment,23 which they often receive in a hospital
emergency room. 2 4 The Institute of Medicine estimates that "20,000
uninsured Americans die each year because the lack of health insur-
ance prevents timely and routine medical care."25
In addition to the individual health consequences, being unin-
sured imposes significant costs on society. The uninsured often
receive medical care from the most expensive places. 26 As a result,
they are not able to adequately compensate their health care provider
for the care they receive.27 The cost of this uncompensated care is
shifted to others in the form of higher insurance premiums and
higher taxes.28 An estimated two to ten percent of the cost of private
health insurance premiums covers uncompensated care for the unin-
sured.29 Annually, uncompensated care accounts for about three per-
cent of health care spending in the United States.30
Failures in the health insurance market contribute to the rising
cost of insurance premiums and the number of uninsured Americans.
One of the market failures is adverse selection.3 1 The "basic concept
of insurance is to spread individual risk across a broad range of enroll-
ees."3 2 For health insurance, this requires a large number of healthy
people to balance the risk posed to insurance companies by people
with serious illnesses.33 Adverse selection refers to the ability of a well-
balanced risk pool to devolve into a pool composed mainly of high-
risk individuals. 34 Our current system allows individuals to freely
23 See WULSIN & DOUGHERTY, supra note 14, at 1.
24 See LYKE, supra note 10, at 3.
25 WULSIN & DOUGHERTY, supra note 14, at 1 n.2 (citing INST. OF MED., AMERICA'S
UNINSURED CRISIS (2009); INST. OF MED., CARE WITHOUT COVERAGE (2009)).
26 Susan A. Channick, Can State Health Reform Initiatives Achieve Universal Coverage?
California's Recent Failed Experiment, 18 S. CAL. INTERisc. L.J. 485, 495 (2009).
27 See C.J. Stimson, Health Care Reform in 2009: The Individual Mandate and the Tax
Exclusion for Employer-Provided Health Care Benefits, 1 VAND. HEALTH L. & PUB. POL'Y F.
12, 14 (2009), http://law.vanderbilt.edu/student-resources/student-organizations/
health-law-society/health-law-forum/download.aspx?id=4189.
28 See WULSIN & DOUGHERTY, supra note 14, at 4; Stimson, supra note 27, at 14.
29 WULSIN & DOUGHERTY, supra note 14, at 4; see also Stimson, supra note 27, at 14
(estimating that, on average, $1100 from every family's health insurance premium will
be used to account for uncompensated care in 2009).
30 WULSIN & DOUGHERTY, supra note 14, at 4 (estimating the cost at thirty-eight
billion dollars per year).
31 See id. at 3.
32 Id.
33 See id. Almost seventy percent of annual health system costs are associated with
ten percent of the population. Id.
34 See Stimson, supra note 27, at 14.
20101 2007
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
enter or exit insurance risk pools. 3 5 Healthy people rationally may
choose not to purchase health insurance until they need it.36 Without
these low-risk individuals, the medical loss ratios of health insurance
companies will increase due to an increased percentage of high-risk
individuals in the risk pool.3 7 Insurance companies are then forced to
increase premiums to offset these losses.38 However, the increase in
premiums may cause healthy people with insurance to cancel their
policies, starting the cycle over again.39
Another health insurance market failure is the free-rider prob-
lem.4 0 Free riders are people with the financial ability "to purchase
health insurance [that] choose not to, knowing they can get emer-
gency care when they need it."41 When they need expensive care and
are unable to pay for it, the cost of their uncompensated care is
shifted to others through increased health insurance premiums and
higher taxes.42
Proponents of an individual mandate for health insurance
believe that it will effectively address the cost and coverage concerns
that drove the push for health care reform.43 Requiring individuals to
purchase health insurance will address the problem of adverse selec-
tion by forcing healthy people into insurance risk pools.44 Health
insurance premiums should decrease as insurance companies are able
to spread the risk posed by seriously ill enrollees across a larger num-
ber of healthy individuals.45 An individual mandate also addresses the
35 See WULSIN & DOUGHERTY, supra note 14, at 3.




40 See WULSIN & DOUGHERTY, supra note 14, at 4.
41 Id.
42 See id.
43 There is by no means a consensus that an individual mandate will actually
decrease the spending on health care, the cost of health insurance premiums, or the
number of people without health insurance. Some argue that an individual mandate
will actually increase the cost of health insurance. See Glen Whitman, Hazards of the
Individual Health Care Mandate, CATO POL'Y REP., Sept.-Oct. 2007, at 10-11 (arguing
that lobbying will increase the number of mandated benefits an insurance policy must
provide, which will drive up insurance premiums). Others doubt that the govern-
ment will be able to effectively enforce the individual mandate. See WuSIN & DOUGH-
ERTY, supra note 14, at 4, 17-18 (noting skepticism based upon past experiences with
enforcing mandates for car insurance (the national average of uninsured motorists in
states mandating insurance is fifteen percent) and paying income taxes (15.5% of
Americans failed to pay their taxes on time in 1998)).




free-rider problem by decreasing the amount of uncompensated care
that health care providers deliver to patients. 46 This should produce a
decrease in the average health insurance premium.47 Due to these
projected benefits, an individual mandate is a central feature of the
PPACA.
II. THE NATURE OF AND PRECEDENT FOR MANDATES
In its 1994 evaluation of proposed health care reform bills con-
taining individual mandates, the Congressional Budget Office noted
"[a] mandate requiring all individuals to purchase health insurance
would be an unprecedented form of federal action. The government
has never required people to buy any good or service as a condition of
lawful residence in the United States."48 One senator has described it
as "'a stunning assault on liberty.'" 49 Before examining the constitu-
tionality of the individual mandate it is useful to review the difference
between prohibitions and mandates as well as the precedent for
mandates.
To prohibit is to prevent someone from doing something.50 In
effect, it means that an individual can do everything but X To man-
date is to order or require that something be done.5 1 In effect, it
means that an individual must do Y It is widely accepted that Con-
gress has the power to prohibit. A mandate is more controversial.
Generally, a prohibition will be less intrusive on a person's freedom
than a mandate.52 Although the freedom to do Xhas been restricted,
the individual still has the freedom to do Y, Z, and any other thing
that is not X.
As the ways to comply with a prohibition decrease, however, the
prohibition begins to have an effect on individual freedom similar to
that of a mandate. For example, the Civil Rights Act of 196468 prohib-
ited the restriction of access to places of public accommodation based
46 See id.
47 See WULSIN & DOUGHERTY, supra note 14, at 4.
48 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 6, at 1.
49 Michael C. Dorf, The Constitutionality of Health Insurance Reform, Part I: The Mis-
guided Libertarian Objection, FINDLAW (Oct. 21, 2009), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/
dorf/20091021.html (quoting Sen. Minority Whip John Kyl).
50 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcrIONARY 1813 (1986).
51 Id. at 1373.
52 Cf Stimson, supra note 27, at 14 (noting conservatives contend that the gov-
ernmental intrusion into private decisionmaking through use of an individual man-
date violates basic notions of individual freedom).
53 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h-6 (2006 & Supp. III 2009).
2010) 2009
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
upon racial discrimination. 54 The only way for innkeepers or restau-
rant owners to comply with this prohibition was to serve African Amer-
icans that entered their establishments. Although styled as a
prohibition, it had the functional effect of a mandate.5 5 Prohibitions
and mandates are two sides of the same regulatory coin, and Congress
has the authority to do either if it is within the scope of one of its
enumerated powers.
The Congressional Budget Office is correct that "l[t]he govern-
ment has never required people to buy any good or service as a condi-
tion [of citizenship]. "56 However, there is precedent for the federal
government mandating individual action as a condition of citizenship.
All Americans are required to pay income taxes5 7 and have an obliga-
tion to serve as jurors when called.58 Also, all American males ages
eighteen to twenty-five must register with the Selective Service Sys-
tem.59 Notably, none of the mandates have been enacted using the
commerce power.
Some commentators have pointed to the requirement that peo-
ple purchase car insurance to lawfully drive a motor vehicle as prece-
dent for an individual mandate to purchase health insurance.6 0 This
analogy is flawed for two reasons. First, the car insurance mandate is a
product of state law.6 1 Since an individual mandate for health insur-
ance will be enacted through federal law, the analogy fails. A car
insurance mandate enacted under state law has no bearing on
whether Congress can pass an individual mandate for health insur-
ance using its limited and enumerated powers. Second, the require-
ment that drivers have car insurance is a conditional mandate. If a
citizen does not wish to purchase car insurance, he can comply with
54 Id. § 2000a.
55 To be clear, I am not suggesting that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was an unde-
sirable infringement on personal liberty. I use it merely to illustrate that the line
between a prohibition and mandate blurs when there are limited ways to comply with
a prohibition.
56 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 6, at 1.
57 See U.S. CONST. amend. XVI; Dorf, supra note 49. The government has
imposed special taxes on income to fund Social Security and Medicare. See Federal
Insurance Contributions Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3125 (2006).
58 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (2006); see Dorf, supra note 49.
59 50 U.S.C. app. § 453 (2006); see CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 6, at 2.
60 See Hoke, supra note 4, at 516 n.108 (drawing the analogy); David G. Savage,
Health Insurance Mandate Alarms Some, L.A. TLMEs, Nov. 1, 2009, http://articles.latimes.
com/2009/nov/01/nation/na-mandatel (noting that President Obama and other
supporters of the individual mandate have drawn the analogy).
61 See WULSIN & DOUGHERTY, supra note 14, at 17 (noting that by 2006, forty-seven
states and the District of Columbia had enacted the mandate).
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the mandate by simply refusing to drive.6 2 Citizens do not have a simi-
lar option to comply with a health insurance mandate without facing a
penalty. They must either purchase health insurance or pay a fine
imposed in the form of higher income taxes.6 3 Due to these differ-
ences, the car insurance mandate should not be viewed as preceden-
tial support for a health insurance mandate.
III. CONGRESS'S ABILITY TO ENACT AN INDIVIDUAL MANDATE FOR
HEALTH INSURANCE USING ITS TAXING POWER
Congress has the "Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties,
Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common
Defence and general Welfare of the United States." 64 The taxing
power is one of the most important congressional powers.6 5 This Part
will explore the scope of the taxing power, the ability of Congress to
enact regulatory taxes, and the ability of Congress to enact an individ-
ual mandate to purchase health insurance through income taxes.
A. The Scope of the Taxing Power
Does Congress have broad power to tax and spend for the gen-
eral welfare, or is it limited to using this power only to carry out its
other enumerated powers?66 Until 1936, the scope of the taxing and
spending power was unclear. The debate over the proper way to inter-
pret the Taxing Clause traces back to the founding of the nation.6 7
James Madison argued, "as the United States is a government of lim-
ited and enumerated powers, the grant of power to tax and spend for
the general national welfare must be confined to the enumerated leg-
islative fields committed to the Congress."6 8 Alexander Hamilton dis-
62 See Kucskar, supra note 15, at 400.
63 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, H.R. 3590, 111th Cong.
§ 5000A (2010) (establishing an individual mandate for a majority of Americans to
purchase health insurance), amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation
Act of 2010, H.R. 4872, 111th Cong. (2010) (imposing a tax penalty for failing to
purchase health insurance).
64 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. Originally, direct taxes, such as an income tax,
were required to be apportioned equally among the states based upon their respective
populations. Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. However, the Sixteenth Amendment exempted
income taxes from this requirement. Id. amend. XVI.
65 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 273 (3d ed. 2006). Alexander
Hamilton described the power to tax as the most important legislative power. THE
FEDERALIST No. 33 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
66 See CHEMERINSKY, supTa note 65, at 274.
67 See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936).
68 Id.
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puted Madison's interpretation, arguing that "the clause confers a
power separate and distinct from [other enumerated powers] . . .
[and is] limited only by the requirement that it shall be exercised to
provide for the general welfare of the United States." 69
In 1936, the Supreme Court addressed the scope of the taxing
and spending power in United States v. Butler.70 Congress passed the
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 193371 in an attempt to stabilize the
price and production levels of agricultural commodities.72 A process-
ing tax on agricultural commodities and a floor tax on the items pro-
duced by the processing of an agricultural commodity "play[ed] an
indispensable part in the plan of regulation."73 After reviewing the
interpretations advocated by Madison and Hamilton, the Court
endorsed Hamilton's view.74 Congress's power to tax is limited by the
requirement that it be exercised for the general welfare and common
defense, not the other enumerated powers. 75 Therefore, "Congress
has broad power to tax and spend for the general welfare so long as it
does not violate other constitutional provisions."76
B. Regulatory Taxes
The Supreme Court used to limit Congress's ability to impose
taxes by distinguishing between revenue-raising taxes, which were per-
missible, and regulatory taxes, which were not.77 The Child Labor Tax
69 Id. at 65-66.
70 297 U.S. 1.
71 Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, ch. 25, 48 Stat. 31, invalidated by Butler,
297 U.S. 1.
72 See Butler, 297 U.S. at 53-54.
73 Id. at 55-56, 59.
74 See id. at 66 (describing Hamilton's position as "the correct one"). The Court
reaffirmed Butler's holding on the scope of the taxing and spending power in South
Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987).
75 See Butler, 297 U.S. at 66. After endorsing Hamilton's position, the Court
declared the Agricultural Adjustment Act unconstitutional on the grounds that it vio-
lated the Tenth Amendment. It held that the regulation of production was left to the
states and that "'Congress is not empowered to tax for those purposes which are
within the exclusive province of the states.'" Id. at 69 (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 224 (1824)). This aspect of Butler has never been followed. How-
ever, its "holding concerning the scope of the taxing and spending powers remains
good law." CHEMERINSKY, supra note 65, at 274.
76 CHEMERINSKv, supra note 65, at 274.
77 See id. at 276-77 (noting that the distinction was judicially created and describ-
ing cases where the Court enforced this distinction); see also United States v. Constan-
tine, 296 U.S. 287, 296 (1935) (invalidating a federal tax on liquor dealers that
violated state liquor laws); Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 66-68 (1922) (invalidating a
[VOL. 85:52012
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Case78 is an example of the Court enforcing this distinction. After its
attempt to regulate child labor under the Commerce Clause was
found to be unconstitutional,7 9 Congress passed the Child Labor Tax
Law,80 which imposed a ten percent excise tax on the net profits of
businesses that employed children.8 1 The Court rejected this effort to
regulate child labor under the tax power.8 2 Although a tax may have
a secondary purpose of regulating activity, it becomes unconstitu-
tional when, "in the extension of the penalizing features of the so-
called tax[,] . . . it loses its character as [a revenue-raising tax] and
becomes a mere penalty with the characteristics of regulation and
punishment."8 3 Thus, the Court held Congress does not have the
power to enact taxes for the primary purpose of regulating activity.
Some commentators have criticized the distinction that the Court
drew between revenue-raising taxes and regulatory taxes as a basis for
using the taxing power.84 They question whether the distinction is
still valid and, if so, whether it has any practical significance.85 Subse-
quent cases indicate that the Court will allow taxes that have a regula-
tory effect as long as they produce some revenue.
The Court addressed the constitutionality of a provision in the
National Firearms Act 86 imposing a $200 annual license tax on fire-
arms dealers in Sonzinsky v. United States.87 Although the tax had a
federal tax sanctioned by the U.S. Department of Agriculture on grain futures con-
tracts that were not approved by a board of trade).
78 Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (Child Labor Tax Case), 259 U.S. 20 (1922).
79 Congress passed the Keating-Owen Act of 1916, ch. 432, 39 Stat. 675, invali-
dated by Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), overruled by United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), prohibiting goods produced in factories by children from
being shipped in interstate commerce. In Hammer, the Court held that Congress
lacked the power to regulate child labor under the Commerce Clause because it was a
matter of "purely state authority." Hammer, 247 U.S. at 276.
80 Act of Feb. 24, 1919, ch. 139, 40 Stat. 1057, invalidated by Child Labor Tax Case,
259 U.S. 20.
81 Id.
82 Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. at 43-44.
83 Id. at 38.
84 See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 65, at 277. Dean Chemerinsky has criticized
the case on two grounds: (1) it draws an arbitrary distinction between revenue-raising
and regulatory taxes because a tax can simultaneously raise revenue and regulate
activity; and (2) it does not address which constitutional principle supports the claim
that Congress cannot uses taxes for regulatory purposes. See id.
85 See id. at 276; see also Adler, supra note 5 (noting that the case is largely irrele-
vant today).
86 Pub. L. No. 73-474, § 2, 48 Stat. 1236, 1237 (1934) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 922 (2006 & Supp. III 2009) and 26 U.S.C. § 5861 (2006)).
87 300 U.S. 506 (1937). A separate provision of the National Firearms Act
imposed a $200 tax on firearms dealers for each sale of a firearm. See National Fire-
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regulatory effect, the Court explained that "[e]very tax is in some
measure regulatory . . . [in that] it interposes an economic impedi-
ment to the activity taxed . . . . But a tax is not any the less a tax
because it has a regulatory effect."8 8 Congress's motives for enacting
the tax are irrelevant as long as the tax produces some revenue. 9
Since the tax had produced some revenue, it was constitutional.90
Congress's ability to enact regulatory taxes as long as they pro-
duce some revenue was reaffirmed in United States v. Kahriger.91 The
Revenue Act of 195192 regulated gambling by imposing a ten percent
excise tax on each wager and a fifty-dollar annual tax on bookmak-
ers.93 The Court upheld the constitutionality of the tax because it
produced some revenue.9 4 It held that regulatory taxes are valid
"[u]nless there are provisions extraneous to any tax need."95 Absent
that, "courts are without authority to limit the exercise of the taxing
power."96
The distinction between revenue-raising and regulatory taxes
established by the Child Labor Tax Case is still valid, but it is clear that,
after Sonzinksy and Kahriger, it no longer does much work. Congress's
purpose in enacting the tax is no longer relevant.97 As long as a regu-
latory tax raises some revenue, it is valid.98 This is not a difficult stan-
arms Act § 3 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 922(t) (5)); Sonzinsky, 300 U.S. at 512.
The Court did not address the constitutionality of the provision because Sonzinksy
was only convicted of failing to pay the annual license tax. Sonzinsky, 300 U.S. at
511-12.
88 See Sonzinsky, 300 U.S. at 513.
89 See id. at 513-14. This represents a departure from the inquiry into congres-
sional motives by the Court in the Child Labor Tax Case. See supra notes 78-83 and
accompanying text.
90 See id. at 514. Only twenty-seven dealers in 1934 and twenty-two dealers in 1935
paid the annual license tax. This suggests the standard for what constitutes "some
revenue" is not very high.
91 345 U.S. 22 (1953).
92 Pub. L. No. 82-183, 65 Stat. 452 (1951).
93 Id. § 301, 65 Stat. at 480; see Kahriger, 345 U.S. at 23-24.
94 See Kahriger, 345 U.S. at 28. Kahriger argued that the wagering tax was
improper because it only raised $4,371,869-revenue that paled in comparison to the
estimated $400 million that Congress had projected it would raise. The Court
rejected this argument, noting that the amount was greater than the $3501 collected
from a tax on butter and filled cheese. Id. at 28 n.4.
95 Id. at 31.
96 Id.
97 See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
98 See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
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dard to meet. Additionally, courts adopt a presumption of
constitutionality when reviewing most taxes.99
Tax legislation will only be held unconstitutional when there is
no reasonable possibility that the legislation is within Congress's
power.100 In theory, a tax would be struck down under the Sonzinsky
and Kahriger standard if there was no reasonable possibility that it
would raise any revenue. For example, a policy expert recently pro-
posed a national tax of one cent per ounce on sugar-sweetened bever-
ages to combat childhood obesity.101 What if Congress instead passed
a $1000-per-ounce tax? Presumably, this would be an unconstitutional
regulatory tax because it would fail to produce any revenue. Practi-
cally, however, it is hard to imagine Congress enacting a regulatory
tax-no matter how punitive-that fails to raise any revenue. As a
result, it is unlikely that any regulatory tax passed by Congress will
exceed its taxing power. Precedent bears this out. In the past seventy
years, "no federal taxing or spending program has been declared to
exceed the scope of Congress's powers."102
C. The Taxing Power and an Individual Mandate to Purchase
Health Insurance
The PPACA imposes a regulatory tax on individuals without
health insurance.103 Functionally, this tax imposes an individual man-
date to purchase health insurance. Can Congress enact the individual
mandate solely through the use of its taxing power? In order to be
constitutional, the individual mandate must be within the scope of the
taxing power and a valid regulatory tax.
Taxing individuals without health insurance is within the scope of
the taxing power. Congress's use of the taxing power is not limited by
99 See Tracy A. Kaye & Stephen W. Mazza, United States-National Report: Constitu-
tional Limitations on the Legislative Power to Tax in the United States, 15 MICH. ST. J. INT'L
L. 481, 481 (2007).
100 See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640-41 (1937).
101 See RUDD CTR. FOR FOOD POLICY & OBESITY, YALE UNIV., Sorr DRINK TAXES: A
POLICY BRIEF 2 (2009), available at http://www.yaleruddcenter.org/resources/
upload/docs/what/reports/RuddReportSoftDrinkTaxFall2009.pdf.
102 Chemerinsky, supra note 5.
103 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, H.R. 3590, 111th Cong.
§ 5000A (2010), amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010,
H.R. 4872, 111th Cong. (2010) (imposing a tax penalty for failing to purchase health
insurance). The legislation exempts certain individuals from the mandate, such as
American Indians, those who meet the hardship criteria, and those who object for
religious religious or who have an income below the poverty line. See id. § 5000A(e).
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its other enumerated powers.10 4 Instead, it has broad power to tax in
order to provide for the general welfare.105 The key question is
whether taxing individuals without health insurance provides for the
general welfare. The answer is clearly yes. Uninsured individuals
impose significant costs on society in the form of increased taxes and
higher insurance premiums.10 6 These costs are sufficient to establish
that taxing uninsured individuals provides for the general welfare
under the deferential standard of review used by courts to evaluate tax
legislation.107 Therefore, the individual mandate is within the scope
of the taxing power.
Additionally, taxing individuals without health insurance is a valid
regulatory tax. The distinction between revenue-raising and regula-
tory taxes is still valid, but it is very easy to satisfy.10 In order to be
constitutional, a regulatory tax must generate some revenue.10 9 The
PPACA imposes an income tax penalty of $750 per adult or $1500 per
household.o10 To be sure, these penalties are punitive measures
intended to force people to purchase health insurance. However,
they are likely to raise some revenue. As long as some revenue is
raised, the individual mandate is a valid regulatory tax."' Therefore,
Congress has the power to enact an individual mandate for health
insurance solely through the taxing power.
IV. CONGRESS'S ABILITY TO ENACT AN INDIVIDUAL MANDATE FOR
HEALTH INSURANCE USING ITS POWER
To REGULATE COMMERCE
Congress has the power to "regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States."" 2 The ability to regulate
104 Some have argued that Congress may only impose regulatory taxes on activities
it can regulate through its other enumerated powers. See, e.g., David B. Rivkin, Jr. &
Lee A. Casey, Illegal Health Reform, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 2009, at A15. However, this
argument is in direct conflict with the broad interpretation of the taxing power
adopted by the Court in Butler. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66 (1936)
(rejecting the argument that the taxing power is limited by other enumerated
powers).
105 See Butler, 297 U.S. at 66.
106 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
107 See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
108 See supra notes 97-102 and accompanying text.
109 See Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513-14 (1937).
110 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, H.R. 3590, 111th Cong.
§ 5000A(c) (2010), amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of
2010, H.R. 4872, 111th Cong. (2010).
111 See Sonzinsky, 300 U.S. at 513-14.
112 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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commerce is the most important of Congress's enumerated powers.11 3
This Part will provide a brief history of commerce clause jurispru-
dence, discuss the current analytical framework established by the
Lopez-Morrison-Raich trilogy, and examine whether Congress may use
its commerce power to enact an individual mandate to purchase
health insurance.
A. A Brief History of Commerce Clause Jurisprudence Pre-Lopez
The Constitution established a government of limited and enu-
merated powers.11 4 Powers not granted to the federal government are
reserved to the states." 5 Since the Founding, the extent of Congress's
power to regulate interstate commerce has been difficult to define. A
broad interpretation of the commerce power would grant Congress a
virtually limitless power to regulate anything, undermining the feder-
alist structure established by the Constitution." 6 Alternatively, nar-
rowly interpreting the commerce power may strip Congress of an
enumerated power and impede the ability of the government to func-
tion effectively.1 7 Throughout history, the Court has struggled to
find judicially enforceable limits on the commerce power.
Gibbons v. Ogden,"8s decided in 1824, forms the basis for all of the
Court's subsequent Commerce Clause jurisprudence.' 19 The issue
before the Court was whether a 1793 federal law that authorized Gib-
bons to operate a ferry in New York waters was a valid use of the com-
merce power.' 20 In upholding the constitutionality of the federal law,
ChiefJustice Marshall established three key principles about the scope
of Congress's commerce power. First, "commerce" refers to transpor-
tation and commercial intercourse.121 It "includes all phases of busi-
113 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 65, at 242.
114 See THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 260 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (noting that "[t]he powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the fed-
eral government are few and defined").
115 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
116 See United States v. Patton, 451 F.3d 615, 622 (10th Cir. 2006).
117 See id. at 622-23.
118 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
119 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 65, at 243 ("To this day, Supreme Court cases
concerning the Commerce Clause begin their analysis by considering Gibbons v.
Ogden.").
120 See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 1-2.
121 See id. at 193. The proper meaning of "commerce" is still the subject of schol-
arly debate: some argue that its original meaning is limited to the trade and exchange
of goods and transportation for those purposes, while others argue the original mean-
ing includes all gainful activity. Compare United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585-87
(1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("At the time the original Constitution was ratified,
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ness, including navigation." 2 2 Second, "among the several states"
refers to activities that impact interstate commerce, including intra-
state activities.' 23 However, the commerce power cannot be used to
regulate "[t]he completely internal commerce of a State."' 24 Finally,
state sovereignty is not a limit on Congress's enumerated powers. 125
When an activity affects interstate commerce, the commerce power
has "no limitations, other than [those] prescribed in the constitu-
tion."126 In sum, Gibbons adopted a broad interpretation of the com-
merce power, while also establishing internal and external limits.'27
However, would the Court be able to effectively enforce these limits?
During the Progressive Era, the Court attempted to enforce inter-
nal and external limits on the commerce power.128 The Court held
that Congress could not use the commerce power to regulate manu-
'commerce' consisted of selling, buying, and bartering, as well as transportation for
these purposes."), and RANDY E. BARNErr, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION
278-91, 295-97 (2004) (arguing that the original meaning of commerce is the trade,
exchange, and transportation of goods, reporting that he found no unambiguous
example of a broader meaning of commerce used in sources contemporaneous to the
Constitution, and criticizing the methodologies of several scholars asserting evidence
of a broader meaning), with Patton, 451 F.3d at 624 ("The best historical scholarship
indicates that in addition to its primary sense of buying, selling, and transporting
merchandise, the term 'commerce' was understood at the Founding to include the
compensated provision of services as well as activities in preparation for selling prop-
erty or services in the marketplace, such as the production of goods for sale."),
MICHAEL CONANT, THE CONSTITUTION AND ECONOMIC REGULATION 86 (2008) (noting
"[1]egal historians present massive evidence that the idea of general commerce
included all gainful activity"), and RobertJ. Pushaw, Jr., The Medical Marijuana Case: A
Commerce Clause Counter-Revolution , 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 879, 886 (2005) (arguing
that, in addition to its primary original meaning, commerce had a "firmly established
secondary definition" of "all gainful activities intended for the marketplace, such as
the production of goods for sale and the compensated provision of services").
122 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 65, at 244.
123 See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 194 ("Commerce among the States[ ] cannot
stop at the external boundary line of each State, but may be introduced into the
interior.").
124 Id. at 195.
125 See id. at 196-97. Marshall notes that the commerce power "would be a very
useless power" if it could not regulate intrastate activity. Id. at 195.
126 Id. at 196.
127 An internal limit is based upon the definition of the power, while an external
limit is based upon a separate constitutional provision or an outside source. In Gib-
bons, the definitions of "commerce" and "among the several states" are internal limits
on the commerce power, while other provisions in the Constitution are external
limits.
128 For a detailed description of attempts to enforce limits on the commerce
power during the Progressive Era, see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 65, at 247-54, summa-
rizing the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence from 1887-1937.
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facturing, which was not commerce, 129 or child labor, which fell
under the scope of the police power reserved to the states by the
Tenth Amendment.130 However, from 1937-1942, the New Deal
Court rejected the attempt by the Progressive Era Court to enforce
internal and external limits on the commerce power.131 It adopted a
policy of near-absolute deference to Congress with respect to the com-
merce power in Wickard v. Filburn,32 which held that Congress may
regulate any activity as long as it has a rational belief that the activity,
in the aggregate, has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.133
Under this standard, "it is difficult to imagine anything that Congress
could not regulate under the commerce clause so long as it was not
violating another constitutional provision." 34 After Wickard, Con-
gress, taking advantage of the Court's extraordinarily broad interpre-
tation, used the commerce power to pass regulatory, criminal, and
civil rights laws.' 3 5
B. The Lopez-Morrison-Raich Trilogy
From 1936 until 1995, no federal laws were held by the Supreme
Court to be an unconstitutional use of the commerce power. 1 3 6 That
streak ended with United States v. Lopez, 13 7 in which the Rehnquist
Court attempted to establish a judicially enforceable limit on Con-
gress's ability to regulate interstate commerce.
129 See United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1895).
130 See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276 (1918), overruled by United States
v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
131 See Darby, 312 U.S. at 115-16; NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S.
1, 36-38 (1937) (holding Congress can regulate manufacturing if it affects interstate
commerce). For a detailed description of changes in Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence during the New Deal Court, see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 65, at 254-59.
132 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
133 See id. at 127-29; BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEw DEAL COURT 218
(1998) (quoting Justice Jackson's memorandum to his colleagues in which he wrote
that the Court's holding in Wickard meant "'the extent of the commerce power
depends upon the facts of each case and that Congress is the primary and final judge
of the meaning of those facts'"); Pushaw, supra note 121, at 890 (noting that judicial
review after Wickard "became an empty formality").
134 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 65 at 260.
135 See id. (discussing these laws and asking whether such a broad definition of the
commerce power is desirable).
136 See id. at 264.
137 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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1. United States v. Lopez
The Gun-Free School Zone Act of 1990 (GFSZA) 13 8 used the
commerce power to make it a federal crime for an individual to "pos-
sess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable
cause to believe, is a school zone." 3 9 Lopez, a twelfth-grade student,
was convicted for carrying a concealed handgun into his high
school.140 The Supreme Court granted certiorari after the Fifth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals held that the statute was unconstitutional.1 4 1
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist "start[ed] with
first principles," noting that the federal government is one of limited
and enumerated powers.14 2 He then summarized the Court's Com-
merce Clause jurisprudence and, in doing so,
identified three broad categories of activity that Congress can regu-
late under its commerce power. First, Congress may regulate the
use of the channels of interstate commerce. Second, Congress is
empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of inter-
state commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce.
Finally, Congress' commerce authority includes the power to regu-
late those activities having a substantial relation to interstate
commerce.14 3
In order to satisfy the third category, economic activity must sub-
stantially affect interstate commerce. 14 4 After establishing this analyti-
cal framework, Rehnquist applied it to the GFSZA. The statute did
not fall within the first two categories.' 4 5 It also did not have a sub-
stantial relation to interstate commerce:
Section 922(q) is a criminal statute that, by its terms, has noth-
ing to do with "commerce" or any sort of economic enterprise, how-
ever broadly one might define those terms. Section 922(q) is not an
essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which
138 Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 1702, 104 Stat. 4789, 4844-45 (1990), invalidated by
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549.
139 Id. § 1702(b) (1), 104 Stat. at 4844.
140 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551-52.
141 Id. at 552.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 558-59 (citations omitted). The first category that Rehnquist identified
allows Congress to prevent classes of goods or people from entering the channels of
interstate commerce. See United States v. Patton, 451 F.3d 615, 621 (10th Cir. 2006).
Under the second category, Congress can regulate things that are actually being
moved in interstate commerce and the means by which they are moved, e.g., by rail-
road or ship. See id. at 621-22.
144 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560.
145 Id. at 559.
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the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activ-
ity were regulated. It cannot, therefore, be sustained. 146
In explaining why the statute had nothing to do with commerce,
Rehnquist noted that the GFSZA did not contain a jurisdictional ele-
ment or any congressional findings about a connection to interstate
commerce.14 7 He rejected the government's attempt to establish a
connection in its brief, claiming it required the Court to "pile infer-
ence upon inference in a manner that would . . . convert congres-
sional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police
power of the sort retained by the States."1 48 After acknowledging that
"prior cases have taken long steps down that road," Rehnquist refused
"to proceed any further," arguing that doing so would grant Congress
unlimited power.149
Lopez is notable for several reasons. First, it was the first time in
almost sixty years that the Supreme Court held Congress's use of its
commerce power to be unconstitutional.1 5 0  Second, the Court
attempted to create two judicially enforceable limits on the commerce
power. Now, in order to be within the scope of the commerce power,
an activity must fall within one of the three categories identified in
Lopez.151 More importantly, Lopez attempted to limit the substantial
effects doctrine adopted in Wickard by distinguishing between eco-
146 Id. at 561 (footnote omitted).
147 See id. at 561-63.
148 Id. at 563-64, 567. For a summary of the government's argument in Lopez, see
Dorf, supra note 5: "Guns near schools intimidate children; intimidated children have
a hard time concentrating on their studies; they learn less; they then grow up to be
less productive members of society; and thus the national economy suffers.".
149 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
150 Lopez produced strong reactions from commentators who worried that the
case, coupled with the Court's other recent federalism decisions, was the bellwether
of a radical departure from the modern understanding of the Constitution. See
Jonathan H. Adler, Is Morrison Dead? Assessing a Supreme Drug (Law) Overdose, 9 LEWIS
& CLu L. REv. 751, 755 (2005). But see id. at 755-59 (arguing that Lopez was a
particularly modest opinion).
151 Several scholars have criticized the tripartite framework established by Rehn-
quist as "doctrinal sleight of hand." See Thomas W. Merrill, Rescuing Federalism After
Raich: The Case for Clear Statement Rules, 9 LEWIs & CLAu L. REv. 823, 839-43 (2005).
Professor Merrill argues that Rehnquist cleverly transformed the tripartite classifica-
tion first described in Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971), as a summary of prior
precedent into a "fixed menu of permissible options." Id. at 839. He criticizes the
classification for failing to properly summarize Commerce Clause jurisprudence, lack-
ing normative force, and failing to include entrenched, popular regulatory programs
such as environmental laws and the war on drugs. See id. at 839-43; cf Pushaw, supra
note 121, at 894 (criticizing Lopez as an attempt to keep prior precedent intact while
avoiding its plain implication that Congress's commerce power is plenary).
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nomic and noneconomic activity.152 As far as the Court was con-
cerned, the substantial effects doctrine and aggregation principle still
applied to economic and interstate activities. However, the Court did
not apply it to the noneconomic, intrastate activity at issue in Lopez.
Therefore, in order for Congress to regulate these activities, a connec-
tion to interstate commerce must be shown that does not rely on a
piling of inferences.
2. United States v. Morrison
In United States v. Morrison,1 53 the Rehnquist Court proved that
Lopez was not an aberration. Section 13981 of the Violence Against
Women Act of 1994 (VAWA)154 created a federal civil remedy for vic-
tims of gender-motivated violence. 155 A freshman at Virginia Poly-
technic Institute brought a lawsuit under this civil remedy provision
against two students she alleged had raped her.15 6 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari after the district and appellate courts both
held that Congress lacked the authority under the commerce clause
to enact § 13981.157 The government argued that the civil remedy
could be enacted using the commerce power because gender-moti-
vated violence has a substantial effect on the national economy.158
Chief Justice Rehnquist, again writing for the majority, began by
reaffirming the three-category framework established by LopeZ.159 He
then proceeded to list four factors used by the Court to determine
whether an activity has a substantial relation to interstate commerce.
First, the nature of the activity is determined.160 For example, in
Lopez, the "noneconomic, criminal nature of the conduct at issue was
152 The economic/noneconomic activity distinction has also been criticized. See
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 656-59 (2000) (BreyerJ., dissenting) (argu-
ing that the distinction is difficult to apply); Merrill, supra note 151, at 840-41 (argu-
ing that Rehnquist created the distinction through "sleight of hand" by shifting the
use of "economic" in Wickard from applying to the effect of the regulation to a
description of the activity regulated); Pushaw, supra note 121, at 895-96 (suggesting
that the distinction was a fundamentally flawed attempt to limit the commerce power
because "economic" is an "umbrella term that covers anything-commercial or not").
153 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
154 Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. IV, 108 Stat. 1902 (1994).
155 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000), invalidated by Morrison, 529 U.S. 598.
156 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 602-03.
157 Id. at 604-05. Both the district and appellate courts concluded that Congress
also lacked the power to enact § 13981 under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
158 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 65, at 267-68.
159 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608-09.
160 Id. at 610-13.
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central [to the Court's decision]."161 Second, the presence of ajuris-
dictional element is considered. 162 Third, congressional findings
about the effect of the activity on interstate commerce, if present, are
examined.163 Finally, the strength of the link between the activity and
interstate commerce is analyzed.1 64 The link must not rely on a piling
of inferences that, if adopted, would grant Congress unlimited regula-
tory power.165
After establishing the analytical framework for the third category,
Rehnquist applied it to § 13981. In the Court's view, gender-moti-
vated crimes "are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activ-
ity." 16 6 While the Court did not adopt a categorical rule against
aggregating noneconomic activity, it noted that in all previous cases in
which the Commerce Clause regulation was upheld, the intrastate
activity was economic in nature.167
Section 13981 did not contain a jurisdictional element. Unlike
Lopez, however, Congress included extensive factual findings about
the effect of gender-motivated violence on interstate commerce.1 68
The existence of congressional findings failed to establish a substan-
tial relation to interstate commerce because they relied "so heavily on
a method of reasoning that we have already rejected as unworkable if
we are to maintain the Constitution's enumeration of powers." 169 The
Court refused to apply the substantial effects doctrine and aggrega-
tion principle to "noneconomic, violent criminal conduct.v170 For the
second time in five years, the Court held a statute was unconstitutional
because it exceeded the scope of Congress's commerce power.171
161 Id. at 610.
162 Id. at 611.
163 Id. at 612 (noting that Congress is not required to make factual findings about
a connection to interstate commerce).
164 Id.
165 Id. at 613.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 614. Congress found that gender-motivated violence affected interstate
commerce by deterring potential victims from traveling interstate, working at inter-
state businesses, or dealing with businesses engaged in interstate commerce. Accord-
ing to Congress, it also diminished national productivity, increased medical costs, and
adversely affected the supply of and demand for interstate products. Id. at 615.
169 Id. at 615.
170 Id. at 617. However, Congress can regulate and punish intrastate violence if it
is "directed at the instrumentalities, channels, or goods involved in interstate com-
merce." Id. at 618.
171 Id. at 619. The Court also held that Congress lacked the power to create a civil
remedy for gender-motivated violence under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Id. at 627.
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Morrison had several important consequences. First, by holding
that § 13981 was unconstitutional, the Court indicated it was serious
about enforcing limits on the commerce power. 1 72 Second, it estab-
lished a four-factor test to determine if an activity substantially affects
interstate commerce, with the first and fourth factors being the most
important.1 7 3 Although it did not adopt a categorical rule against
applying the aggregation principle to noneconomic activity, it noted
that no prior cases had done so. Finally, Morrison strongly suggested
that the Court would impose a higher standard ofjudicial scrutiny on
the regulation of noneconomic, intrastate activity than a rational basis
review.1 74 The Court rejected congressional findings that would have
been sufficient to establish that Congress had a rational basis for
believing gender-motivated violence had a substantial effect on inter-
state commerce.175 In doing so, Morrison went further than Lopez in
limiting the scope of the commerce power.17 6
172 See Adler, supra note 150, at 758-62. Professor Adler argues that Morrison, not
Lopez, was "the real breakthrough for enumerated powers jurisprudence." Id. at 759.
Due to the modesty of the opinion in Lopez, federal district and appellate courts
"proved themselves completely uninterested in striking down additional federal laws."
Id. at 758. Morrison indicated the Court was serious about judicial safeguards for fed-
eralism and would no longer merely rely on political safeguards. As a result, federal
courts became increasingly willing to uphold as-applied Commerce Clause challenges.
Id. at 758. But see Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, What Hath Raich
Wrought? Five Takes, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 915, 930-31 (2005) (arguing that Lopez
and Morrison-not Raich-are the outliers in the Rehnquist Court's Commerce
Clause jurisprudence).
173 See Adler, supra note 150, at 759-61.
174 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 637 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("Although a new jurispru-
dence has not emerged with any distinctness, it is clear that some congressional con-
clusions about obviously substantial, cumulative effects on commerce are being
assigned lesser values than the once-stable doctrine would assign them. These devalu-
ations are accomplished not by any express repudiation of the substantial effects test
or its application through the aggregation of individual conduct, but by supplanting
rational basis scrutiny with a new criterion of review."); see also Ilya Somin, Gonzales v.
Raich: Federalism as a Casualty of the War on Drugs, 15 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 507,
518 (2006) ("Although Morrison did not explicitly reject the rational basis test, the
majority's failure to apply the test and their explicit imposition of a considerably
higher standard of scrutiny strongly suggested that, at the very least, rational basis
analysis does not apply to regulations of intrastate, 'noneconomic' activity.").
175 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 637 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that the statute
"would have passed muster at any time between Wickard in 1942 and Lopez in 1995").
176 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 65, at 269.
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3. Gonzalez v. Raich
After Lopez and Moison, it appeared that, in addition to the
political process,' 77 Congress's commerce power was also subject to
judicially enforceable limits. That appearance turned out to be a
mirage after Gonzalez v. Raich.178
Congress passed the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act of 1970179 to aid in the "war on drugs" by enhancing fed-
eral drug enforcement powers. 80 The Act consisted of three titles,
including the Controlled Substances Act (CSA),181 which sought to
control legitimate and illegal traffic in controlled substances.18 2 It cat-
egorized all controlled substances into five schedules and made it ille-
gal to manufacture, distribute, dispense, or possess any controlled
substance in a way that was not authorized by the CSA.183 Marijuana
was classified as a Schedule I drug due to its high potential for abuse
and lack of any accepted medical use.184 As a result, it was illegal
under federal law to manufacture, distribute, or possess marijuana
unless it was for a preapproved Food and Drug Administration
research study.185
In 1996, California passed the Compassionate Use Act of 1996
(CUA)1 86 to provide seriously ill residents access to marijuana for
medicinal purposes.'87 The Act prevented the criminal prosecution
of, among other parties, patients who possess or grow marijuana for
medicinal purposes.188 Angel Raich and Diane Monson were both
seriously ill California residents who possessed and used marijuana
177 See generally Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of
the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REv.
543 (1954) (arguing that courts do not need to enforce federalism as a limit on con-
gressional action because the political process will adequately protect the interests of
the states).
178 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
179 Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
21 and 42 U.S.C.).
180 See Raich, 545 U.S. at 12-13.
181 Pub. L. No. 91-513, tit. II, 84 Stat. 1242 (1970) (codified as amended at 21





186 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West Supp. 2005).
187 Id.
188 Id. Under the statute, the patient's use of marijuana must be recommended or
approved by a doctor. Id.
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validly under the CUA.189 They sought injunctive relief after federal
agents seized their marijuana.190 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit ordered the district court to issue a preliminary injunction,
holding that Raich and Monson were likely to prevail on their as-
applied Commerce Clause challenge to the CSA.191 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari.192
Justice Stevens, who had dissented in Lopez and Morrison, wrote
the majority opinion. He began by acknowledging the validity of the
three-category framework for Commerce Clause regulation set forth
in Lopez.' 93 After analogizing the facts of the present case to Wick-
ard,19 4 Stevens analyzed the possession and production of marijuana
for medicinal use under the third category. First, he stressed that a
rational basis inquiry is the proper standard of review for determining
whether an activity substantially affects interstate commerce.19 5 Next,
he distinguished Raich from Lopez and Morrison. Seizing upon the
Court's statement in Lopez that "[s]ection 9 22(q) is not an essential
part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regula-
tory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regu-
lated," Stevens concluded that the classification of marijuana as a
Schedule I drug "was merely one of many" essential parts of the Com-
prehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970.196 Addi-
tionally, Stevens concluded that the activities regulated by the CSA,
unlike those in the GFSZA or VAWA, "are quintessentially eco-
nomic."19 7 To prove this, he defined "economics" as "the production,
distribution, and consumption of commodities."19 8 Therefore, since
regulating the production of marijuana was an essential part of a
larger regulatory scheme and also economic activity, the substantial
effects doctrine and aggregation principle applied. The Court upheld
the constitutionality of the CSA as applied to Raich and Monson. At
the end of his opinion, Stevens noted that although judicial relief was
189 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 6-7 (2005).
190 Id. at 7.
191 Id. at 8-9 (summarizing the Ninth Circuit's ruling that Raich's and Monson's
possession of marijuana was not covered by the CSA because it was not drug traffick-
ing and did not enter the stream of commerce).
192 Id. at 9.
193 Id. at 16-17.
194 Id. at 17-19 (noting that both cases involved the homegrown consumption of
commodities and regulations designed to control supply and demand).
195 See id. at 24.
196 Id. at 24-25.
197 Id. at 25.




unavailable, perhaps a more important avenue of relief was available
in the form of "the democratic process, in which the voices of voters
allied with these respondents may one day be heard in the halls of
Congress."1 99
Raich undermined the Rehnquist Court's attempt to establish
judicially enforceable limits on the commerce power in several ways.
First, it asserted that a rational basis standard of review would be used
to determine whether an activity substantially affects interstate com-
merce, regardless of whether the activity is economic. 200 Although
Morrison did not expressly reject rational basis review for
noneconomic intrastate activity, it strongly implied -that a higher stan-
dard of review was appropriate. 201 Under a rational basis standard of
review, Congress can effectively regulate any noneconomic intrastate
activity as long as it does not violate another constitutional provision.
Second, it established an exception to the Lopez framework that allows
Congress to regulate noneconomic intrastate activity in the third cate-
gory if it is essential to a larger regulatory scheme. 202 This encourages
Congress to draft broad legislation to ensure the constitutionality of
suspect provisions. 203 Under this exception, regulation of the activi-
ties in Lopez and Morrison would presumably have been valid if they
had been part of a larger regulatory scheme. Finally, Raich rendered
the distinction between economic and noneconomic activity virtually
meaningless through its definition of "economic."204 While some
199 Id. at 33.
200 See Somin, supra note 174, at 518 (arguing that the Court's failure to "explicitly
repudiate the rational basis standard allowed the Raich majority to make use of it
without even considering the possibility that it might no longer be applicable").
201 See supra notes 174-76 and accompanying text.
202 One scholar has suggested that Raich may be read as elevating activities that
are an essential part of a large regulatory scheme to the status of a fourth category of
permissible regulation. See Merrill, supra note 151, at 843.
203 See Raich, 545 U.S. at 46-47 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In her dissent, Justice
O'Connor argued that the exception reduced Lopez to a drafting guide for Congress
and invited increased federal regulation of local activity. Moreover, O'Connor
explained that she
did not understand our discussion of the role of courts in enforcing the
outer limits of the Commerce Clause for the sake of maintaining the federal-
ist balance our Constitution requires as a signal to Congress to enact legisla-
tion that is more extensive and more intrusive into the domain of state
power.
Id. at 47 (citation omitted); see also Reynolds & Denning, supra note 172, at 922-23
(agreeing with Justice O'Connor's criticism).
204 See Raich, 545 U.S. at 49 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court's definition
of economic activity for the purposes of Commerce Clause jurisprudence threatens to
sweep all of productive human activity into federal regulatory reach.").
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activities may fail to fall within this definition, the definition itself does
little to limit Congress's ability to regulate using the commerce
power.205
Although Raich did not overrule Lopez and Morrison, it marked a
clear departure from the Court's prior efforts to establish judicially
enforceable limits on the commerce power. Indeed, some wonder
whether anything is left of either Lopez or Morrison, and, more
broadly, the Rehnquist Court's efforts to protect federalism through
judicial review. 206
C. The Commerce Power and an Individual Mandate to Purchase
Health Insurance
Congress has never used its commerce power to require individu-
als to purchase a private good or service as a condition of citizen-
ship.207 Can the power to regulate interstate commerce be used to
impose an individual mandate to purchase health insurance? Since
the individual mandate does not fall within the first two categories of
the Lopez-Morrison-Raich framework, this subpart will focus on whether
an individual's decision not to purchase health insurance is substan-
tially related to interstate commerce.
There are two ways to establish a substantial relation to interstate
commerce. First, as long as Congress has a rational basis for believing
an economic activity has a substantial effect on interstate commerce in
the aggregate, the Court will uphold the regulation as constitu-
tional.208 In Raich, the Court defined "economic" as "the production,
205 See United States v. Patton, 451 F.3d 615, 625 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that
possession of body armor is not economic activity); Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: Limit-
ing Raich, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 743, 749 (2005) (arguing that personal conduct
such as sex, reading a book, and most violent crimes are not covered by the defini-
tion). But see Somin, supra note 174, at 514-15 (arguing that the definition could
allow the regulation of sex because it is a commodity in the economic sense of the
term, and possibly violent crimes such as rape, which could be characterized as theft
of a commodity).
206 See Raich, 545 U.S. at 70 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that "[o]ne searches
[the majority opinion in Raich] in vain for any hint of what aspect of American life is
reserved to the States"); see also Reynolds & Denning, supra note 172, at 932 ("[I]t
seems the Rehnquist Court conjured a zombie federalism that wandered aimlessly for a
while, killing off the occasional federal statute drafted with no thought as to constitu-
tionality (akin to the usual horror movie zombie victims who wander away from the
group), but which, in the end, was pretty easy to kill without even the aid of a shot-
gun-wielding action hero.").
207 See supra Part II.
208 See Raich, 545 U.S. at 17, 22.
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distribution, and consumption of commodities."2 09 Although this def-
inition is extraordinarily broad, it probably does not include an indi-
vidual's decision not to purchase health insurance. No commodity is
produced, distributed, or consumed when a person decides not to
purchase health insurance. However, several scholars have argued for
a less rigid application of the Raich definition. 21 0 Professor Jack
Balkin considers the failure to purchase health insurance a form of
self-insurance from an economic standpoint.2 1' He argues this is eco-
nomic activity because
[fWirst, the decision to self-insure (i.e., not to purchase insurance) is
part of a larger set of individual budgetary calculations about con-
sumption and employment choices. Second, uninsured persons
substitute the purchase and use of emergency medical services and
over-the-counter health remedies, which is clearly economic activity
under Raich and cumulatively affects interstate commerce.2 12
The difference between these approaches is one of perspective.
The first approach focuses on the decision not to purchase health
insurance itself, while Professor Balkin's focuses on the broader con-
text in which the decision is made. The latter approach implicates the
concern of several Justices that the Raich definition of economics
"threatens to sweep all of productive human activity into federal regu-
latory reach."213 It is difficult to imagine any decision not to purchase
a good or service that cannot be characterized as "part of a larger set
of individual budgetary calculations about consumption and employ-
ment choices." 214 As a result, it moves closer to granting Congress an
unlimited power to regulate using the commerce power.
Under Professor Balkin's approach, the substantial effects doc-
trine and aggregation principle will apply. In light of the costs
209 Id. at 25-26.
210 See Ilya Somin, Does a Federal Mandate Requiring the Purchase of Health Insurance
Exceed Congress' Powers Under the Commerce Clause?, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Sept. 20,
2009, 7:28 PM), http://www.volokh.com/posts/1253489281.shtml (suggesting that,
under Raich, the decision whether to purchase health insurance is probably economic
activity because it is contracting for the provision of medicine and other commodities
in the event of sickness); see also jack M. Balkin, Rebuttal: The Constitutionality of an
Individual Mandate for Health Insurance, 158 U. PA. L. REv. PENNUMBRA 102, 106-08
(2009), http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/HealthyDebate.pdf (presenting
arguments for considering the decision whether to purchase health insurance as an
economic activity).
211 See Balkin, supra note 210, at 108.
212 Id.
213 Raich, 545 U.S. at 49 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Thomas joined Justice O'Connor's opinion.
214 Balkin, supra note 210, at 108.
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imposed by the adverse selection and free-rider problems in the insur-
ance market,215 there will be little difficulty in establishing that Con-
gress had a rational basis to believe individual decisions not to
purchase health insurance substantially affect interstate commerce in
the aggregate. However, if such decisions are not classified as eco-
nomic activities, the constitutionality of an individual mandate
enacted using the commerce power will turn on whether Congress
can regulate them as noneconomic activities.
A substantial relation to interstate commerce can be established
in another way. Congress can regulate noneconomic activity if it has a
rational basis to believe it is an essential part of a larger regulatory
scheme.216 An individual mandate is one part of comprehensive
health care reform legislation. The key question is whether Congress
has a rational basis to believe it is an essential part of that legislation.
As discussed in Part I, health care spending in the United States was
equivalent to 16.2% of GDP in 2007. Uninsured Americans are con-
tributing to the rising costs of health care and insurance premiums
due to their inability to adequately compensate health care providers
for the care they receive. Additionally, the ability to freely enter and
exit health insurance risk pools is contributing to rising insurance pre-
miums through adverse selection. Proponents of the individual man-
date argue that it will help restrain the rise in health care spending
and insurance premiums by addressing the free-rider problem and
adverse selection. This is sufficient to establish Congress had a
rational basis to believe an individual mandate is an essential part of
comprehensive health care reform. Therefore, under Raich, Con-
gress can impose an individual mandate using its commerce power.
Some commentators argue that an individual mandate is uncon-
stitutional within the Lopez-Morrison-Raich framework. Instead of clas-
sifying the decision not to purchase health insurance as an economic
or noneconomic activity, they claim it is not an "activity" at all. 217
Therefore, Congress cannot regulate it under the Commerce Clause
because a substantial relation to interstate commerce cannot be estab-
lished.218 Although this distinction may be intuitively appealing, it is
difficult to enforce in practice. As Professor Balkin demonstrated, the
decision to not purchase health insurance can be described as an
activity when it is considered in the broader context of individual
215 See supra Part I.
216 See Raich, 545 U.S. at 22-25.




budgetary calculations. 219 This makes the distinction ill suited to be a
judicially enforceable limit on the commerce power.
Since Congress can require individuals to purchase insurance by
using its taxing power,220 the individual mandate provides the Court
with an opportunity to limit Raich without invalidating the legislation.
In order to restore judicially enforceable limits on the commerce
power, the Court could adopt a narrower definition of economic activ-
ity,22 1 a higher standard of review for regulation of noneconomic
intrastate activity than a rational basis inquiry,222 or define what con-
stitutes a substantial effect on interstate commerce.223 If it chooses
not to do so, the political process will remain the only functional limit
on Congress's ability to regulate using the commerce power.
CONCLUSION
Under current Supreme Court precedent, it appears that House
Speaker Nancy Pelosi's response to the question about the constitu-
tionality of an individual mandate for health insurance was justified.
In light of the Court's broad interpretation of the taxing and com-
merce powers, and the standard of rational basis judicial review, there
are few judicially enforceable limits on Congress's ability to impose
taxes and regulate behavior affecting interstate commerce. A tax on
individuals without health insurance would raise revenue, and there is
little doubt that uninsured Americans, in the aggregate, substantially
affect interstate commerce. Therefore, Congress has the power to
enact an individual mandate for health insurance using either its com-
merce or taxing powers.
This Note has not addressed whether the Court has properly
interpreted the Taxing and Spending Clause and the Commerce
Clause. However, I will highlight one criticism of the Court's interpre-
tation that may be applicable in light of Speaker Pelosi's response to
the individual mandate question. The rational basis standard of
219 See supra notes 210-12 and accompanying text.
220 See supra Part III.C.
221 See Barnett, supra note 205, at 749 (noting that the Court gave no explanation
for why it adopted a broad definition of "economic activity" over several narrower
ones and suggesting that the definition could be treated as dicta in the future).
222 See id. at 747 (describing the decision to apply rational basis review to non-
economic intrastate activity as "one of the less well-theorized or defended aspects of
the Court's opinion" and suggesting that if "Raich has a point that is vulnerable to
future revision by the Court, this is it").
223 See Pushaw, supra note 121, at 895 (criticizing the Court for failing to "provide
any concrete guidelines for determining what counts as 'substantial' or how this effect
should be calculated").
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review used by the Court to review the commerce and taxing powers
shows substantial deference to Congress's assessment of the constitu-
tionality of its legislation. Congress has a duty to interpret whether its
legislation is consistent with the powers enumerated in the Constitu-
tion. If Congress instead defers to the Supreme Court's assessment,
the individual mandate for health insurance in the PPACA will be
upheld without either body examining its constitutionality. 224
224 See Randy Barnett, "Constitutionality" and the Real Constitution, THE VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Sept. 22, 2009, 11:00 AM), http://volokh.com/posts/1253566626.shtml
(arguing that this is an accurate description of the current state of American constitu-
tional law).
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